EECS4315 Mission-Critical Systems

Lecture Notes

<u>Winter 2025</u>

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Lecture 1 - January 6

Syllabus & Introduction

Safety-Critical Systems Verification vs. Validation Theorem Proving vs. Model Checking TLA+

Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)

CLO1 Explain the importance of safety, mission, business, and security-critical systems.

CLO2 Demonstrate knowledge of the importance of good software engineering practices for the for the. amal werhals. critical systems.

CLO3 Use rigorous software engineering methods to develop dependable software applications that are accompanied by certification evidence for their safety and correctness.

CLO4 Demonstrate knowledge of the method and tools using deductive approaches (such as theorem proving). 3342



CLO5 Demonstrate knowledge of methods and tools for algorithmic approaches (such as model checking, bounded satisfiability) etc. USIS.



CLO6 Demonstrate knowledge of the theory underlying deductive and algorithmic approaches.

Use industrial strength tools associated with the methods on large systems. CLO7



General Tips about Success

HARD WORK PERSISTENCE LATE NIGHTS REJECTIONS SACRIFICES DISCIPLINE CRITICISM DOUBTS FAILURE RISKS

SUCCESS

Source: https://a.co/d/aQ13fR1

Critical Systems (SCS) Safery



Lecture 2 - January 8

Introduction

Lab1 Guidance Verification vs. Validation Mission- vs. Safety-Critical Systems

Announcements/Reminders

- Lab1 released
- Scheduled lab session tomorrow at 9am
- Office Hours: 3pm to 4pm, Mon/Tue/Wed/Thu
- Trial attendance check via iClicker today!
- Slides on Math Review (Predicates) posted
- Notes template posted
- Monday lecture venue (R N203) unchanged



Goals: Verification vs. Validation

- Implementation (Java, Python)
- Requirements Document (Natural Language)
- Validity: Ambiguity, Incompleteness, Contradiction
- Compiler Technology (e.g., ANTLR4 @ EECS4302)

Kel

=3112 : Conferct/machine check/prove

Pocoment



Conforms

4215: mode



Impementation

Jaa.

Mission-Critical vs. Safety-Critical

Safety critical

When defining safety critical it is beneficial to look at the definition of each word independently. Safety typically refers to being free from danger, injury, or loss. In the commercial and military industries this applies most directly to human life. Critical refers to a task that must be successfully completed to ensure that a larger, more complex operation succeeds. Failure to complete this task compromises the integrity of the entire operation. Therefore a safety-critical application for an **RTOS** implies that execution failure or faulty execution by the operating system could result in injury or loss of human life.

Safety-critical systems demand software that has been developed using a well-defined, mature software development process focused on producing quality software. For this very reason the DO-178B specification was created. DO-178B defines the guidelines for development of aviation software in the USA. Developed by the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), the DO-178B standard is a set of guidelines for the production of software for airborne systems. There are multiple <u>criticality levels</u> for this software (A, B, C, D, and E).

These levels correspond to the consequences of a software failure: Level A is catastrophic Level B is hazardous/severe Level C is major Level D is minor Level E is no effect

Safety-critical software is typically DO-178B level <u>A or B</u>. At these higher levels of software criticality the software objectives defined by DO-178B must be reviewed by an independent party and undergo more rigorous testing. Typical safety-critical applications include both military and commercial flight, and engine controls.

Mission critical

A mission refers to an operation or task that is assigned by a higher authority. Therefore a mission-critical application for an RTOS implies that a failure by the operating system will prevent a task or operation from being performed, possibly preventing successful completion of the operation as a whole.

Mission-critical systems must also be developed using well-defined, mature

software development processes. Therefore they also are subjected to the rigors of DO-178B. However, unlike safety-critical applications, missioncritical software is typically DO-178B level C or D. Mission-critical systems only need to meet the lower criticality levels set forth by the DO-178B specification.

Generally mission-critical applications include <u>navigation systems</u>, <u>avionics</u> <u>display systems</u>, and <u>mission command</u> and control.

Source: http://pdf.cloud.opensystemsmedia.com/advancedtca-systems.com/SBS.JanO4.pdf

(CI) System & 73 MT85707-Cuttal. st of kar the (Cz) Sylstem <u>S</u> <u>rs</u> <u>safety-arttrca</u>: weden clarm <u>1</u> Ci <u>S</u> Cz <u>not</u> trup eneral <u>n general</u> <u>dispared</u> <u>s' as a weares</u> $C_3 \Rightarrow C_1 C_2 T_5 chim$ $<math>C_1 \Leftrightarrow C_2 \alpha stronger C_1 cons$ stonger claim (う) then salstem ù MTSSTON-CN FFTCGI ing (1) thavi safety arttica,

Lecture 3 - January 13

Introduction

Software Development Process Assurance Cases Correct by Construction State Space Counter Problem: Theorem Proving Announcements/Reminders

- Lab1 released
- Office Hours: 3pm to 4pm, Mon/Tue/Wed/Thu

Building the product right? Building the right product?



Software Development Process



- Natural Language (incomplete, ambiguous, contradicting)
- Requirement Elicitation
- Blueprints
- Not necessarily executable & testable
- API Given
- Efficient (data structures & algorithms)
- Unit Tests 🛩



IMPLEMENTATION

- Customer's Acceptance
- Recall?

Certifying Systems: Assurance Cases



Source: https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/whitepaper/2009_019_001_29066.pdf



Correct by Construction



No no: a single model containing all details

Source: https://audiobookstore.com/audiobooks/failure-is-not-an-option-1.aspx

Correct by Construction: Bridge Controller System



state space of a Model

Definition: The state space of a model is # model is # model is $f(-1) = 2/2 \cdot 3 = 3$ the set of <u>all</u> possible valuations of its declared <u>constants</u> and <u>variables</u>, subject to declared constraints. the more valuations of variables/constants $\#^{2}$ $\#^$

e.g. C: £1,2,33

type of constant

to

Nack

Say an initial model of a bank system with two constants and a variable: $c \in \mathbb{N}1 \land L \in \mathbb{N}1 \land accounts \in String \Rightarrow \mathbb{Z} \xrightarrow{\mathsf{cet}} \xrightarrow{\mathsf{r}} \xrightarrow{\mathsf{r}}$

Q1. Give some example configurations of this initial model's state space.

 $\begin{pmatrix} \zeta = bo_{3}, \zeta_{1} = 5^{\circ 0}, accounts = \xi \\ \zeta = 5^{\circ 0}, \zeta_{2} = 5^{\circ 0}, accounts = \xi \\ bill' \mapsto baoo3 > \zeta = 5^{\circ 0}, \zeta_{2} = 5^{\circ 0}, accounts = \xi \\ bill' \mapsto baoo3 > \zeta = 5^{\circ 0}, \zeta_{2} = 5^{\circ 0}, \delta \\ \zeta = 5^{\circ 0}, \zeta_{2} = 5^{\circ 0}, accounts = \xi \\ c \in N_{1} \rightarrow cord \\ f \in N_{2} \rightarrow cord \\ f \in N_{2}$

Exercise: Theorem Proving vs. Model Checking



TAC/TANO_1/JUV TACITANO_ZI INV Theorem Proving: Deductive Approach via Inference Rules TAC Z. Proof Obtractions > 1. Formulate the model 2. Vischarge prof obtigations. machine (dynamitc) (pre VARIABLES (1.) CONSTANTS assame ron TALANTANIS MIN, MAX TON COM TNAMANTS typing second tul. to hold AXTOMS TMJO_1: CEN MINEN TAVO_2: MINECA CE MAR SAPPRY CONSEVERTH MAXEN T(C< MAX) -> drsabled EVENTS MIN = MAX OPC When - MAX [> MIN Context (static) better c:= c-1 pro encl T := T + T

Lecture 4 - January 15

Introduction, Math Review

Counter Problem: Model Checking Reachability Graph Commutativity vs. Short-Circuit Eval.

Announcements/Reminders

- Lab1 released
- TA contact information (on-demand for labs) on eClass
- I will attend tomorrow's scheduled lab session
- Office Hours: 3pm to 4pm, Mon/Tue/Wed/Thu





Model Checking: Algorithmic Approach via Exhaustive Search







TLA+ Toolbox

TLA + (<u>Temporal Logic of Actions</u>) is a high-level language for modeling programs and systems—especially concurrent and distributed ones. It's based on the idea that the best way to describe things precisely is with simple mathematics.

> Lestre Lamport

TLA+ and its tools are useful for eliminating fundamental **design errors**, which are hard to find and expensive to correct in code.

TLA+ is a language for modeling *software* <u>above</u> the code level and *hardware* <u>above</u> the circuit level.

It has an *IDE* (Integrated Development Environment) for writing models and running tools to check them. The tool most commonly used by engineers is the *TLC model checker*, but there is also a proof checker.

TLA+ is based on mathematics and does not resemble any programming language. Most engineers will find *PlusCal*, described below, to be the easiest way to/start using TLA+.

Kogles



4315 TLA+ toolbox (no notion of refinement) No module ٨· MI module asbsc.n

Logical Operator vs. Programming Operator Commutativity (math) $p \lor q$ $p \wedge q$ D a = QAP true true true true false false true true 4VP PVZE false false true true Programman false _-false false false 11 g ≠ g 88 P 11 g ≠ g 11 p Q. Are the \wedge and \checkmark operators equivalent to, respectively, && and || in Java? 2- p & Z Q : Evaluation left to right L (CI) p evaluates (D -> still need to eval Q (CZ) p Evaluate (F) -> skip eval. of Q -> overall (F)

(1) ī < a. length && a[i] > 10 & z i> 0

(2) [70 & a[[] 710 & i < a.length

(Q1) Poes & work alwards? (QZ) YES -> show NO -> grue à counter-scenare where failure accurs.

Lecture 5 - January 20

Math Review

Formulating the Model Checking Problem Describing Implications Theorems of Propositional Logic

Announcements/Reminders

- Lab1 due this Thursday (Jan 23)
- TA contact information (on-demand for labs) on eClass
- Office Hours: 3pm to 4pm, Mon/Tue/Wed/Thu

Model Checking Problem

(1) Given module M and some invariant property P:

 $\forall s \cdot s \in RG(m) \Rightarrow I(s)$

(We don't rave about unreachable stare) witness foldton (2) When there's a counter-example: $\exists s \cdot s \in RG(m) \land \neg R(s)$ Counter trace $\overset{\text{M}}{\longrightarrow} \bigcirc \bigcirc \odot$

all reachable states of being the system being modeled.
a. length == 10 (1) (1) < a. length && a[i] > 10 & x ⊂ > 0 (1) (1) < a. length && a[i] > 10 & x ⊂ > 0

(2) []71 0 && a[[]710 && []2 a.length

(AI) <u>Neither (1) nor</u> (2, works all the time.

(AZ) Tor (1), INO checked too late. e.g. I==-1 will tagge AIOBE.

For (z) 3 (< a. length rhecked too late e.g. [==]] will trigger

AI OBE.

















 $\frac{Example}{Inverse}, Converse, Contrapositive} \xrightarrow{Re Morgan} \neg (p \land g) \equiv \neg p \lor 2g$ $\chi > 0 \land \chi \leq z \Rightarrow \Rightarrow \chi \Rightarrow z \Rightarrow \lor \zeta < 46 \neg (p \lor g) \equiv \neg p \land 2g$ $\underbrace{Inverse}_{Inverse}$ $e_{V_{1}}^{(n)} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \frac{1}{$ $\frac{\chi_{\leq 0} \vee \chi_{>23} \Rightarrow \chi_{<23} \wedge \chi_{7} 46}{1000}$ y > 23 v y<46 => x>0 ∧ x ≤ 23 $\frac{\int \partial A trapositive : \partial A verse of TAVESP}{2 < 23 \land 27 : 46 \Rightarrow \chi \leq 0 \lor \chi > 23}$







Lecture 6 - January 22

Math Review

∀ vs. ∃: Syntax, Meaning, Examples
 ∀ vs. ∃: Proof Strategies
 Switching between ∀ and ∃

Announcements/Reminders

- Lab1 due tomorrow (Jan 23)
- Lab2 to be released next week (by Monday's class)
- TA contact information (on-demand for labs) on eClass
- Office Hours: 3pm to 4pm, Mon/Tue/Wed/Thu



Proglest/Labs : ASCII Syntax

Lectures/Exan month syntax on paper

may also be may also be write in write in plustal syntax









Logical Quantifiers: Proof Strategies

How to prove \forall i \bullet R(i) \Rightarrow P(i) ? ① Assume R(ī). Show P(ī) ② Prove ¬R(ī) so as to consider all values in the range Skore ¬R(ī) = Fake (empty range) How to prove $\exists i \bullet R(i) \land P(i)$? When a (satisfaction) witness I: R(I) and R(I) How to disprove \forall i • R(i) \Rightarrow P(i) ? O GINE a (violation) witness [I]: R(I) but TP(I) $T \Rightarrow F \equiv F$ Mt. without) How to <u>disprove</u> I i • R(i) A P(i)? (1) Show TR(I) (empty vange ~ no way to find a sat. witness) (2) Show R(I) ~ TR(I) for all I that satisfies R. (the of values in the ran values in (1) Show R(I) ~ TR(I) (empty vange ~ no way to find a sat. with the ran values in (1) Show R(I) ~ TR(I) (empty vange ~ no way to find a sat. with the ran values in (1) Show R(I) ~ TR(I) (empty vange ~ no way to find a sat. with the ran values in (1) Show R(I) ~ TR(I) (empty vange ~ no way to find a sat. with the ran values in (1) Show R(I) ~ TR(I) (empty vange ~ no way to find a sat. with the ran values in (1) Show R(I) ~ TR(I) (empty vange ~ no way to find a sat. with the ran values in (1) Show R(I) ~ TR(I) (empty vange ~ no way to find a sat. with the ran values in (1) Show R(I) ~ TR(I) (empty vange ~ no way to find a sat. with the ran values in (1) Show R(I) ~ TR(I) (empty vange ~ no way to find a sat. with the ran values in (1) Show R(I) ~ TR(I) (empty vange ~ no way to find a sat. with the ran values in (1) Show R(I) ~ TR(I) ~ TR(I) (empty vange ~ no way to find a sat. with the ran values in (1) Show R(I) ~ TR(I) ~ TR(I) (empty vange ~ no way to find a sat. with the ran values in (1) Show R(I) ~ TR(I) ~ TR(I) (empty vange ~ no way to find a sat. with the ran values in (1) Show R(I) ~ TR(I) ~ TR(I) (empty vange ~ no way to find a sat. with the ran values in the ran values in the ran value in the ran values in the ran value in the

Prove/Disprove Logical Quantifications







 $(\exists X \bullet R(X) \land P(X)) \Leftrightarrow \neg (\forall X \bullet R(X) \Rightarrow \neg P(X)) \xrightarrow{\text{De Morgan}}$

Lecture 7 - January 27

Lab1 Review (Part 1), Lab2 Preview

Finite Reachability Graph with Cycles Atomic Updates with a Single Label Algo. Contracts: Pre- & Post-condition Announcements/Reminders

- Lab1 solution released
- Lab2 released
- TA contact information (on-demand for labs) on eClass
- Office Hours: 3pm to 4pm, Mon/Tue/Wed/Thu





1. When defining modules, try to be as "Correct" as possible. 2. Write "good" TANGETEANS / Dessartions to vertige. → TLC checker V → set small bounds on constants and import the state graph to make sive the system works as experiend with the line of th

Lab1 Solution Discussion: Atomic vs. Non-Atomic Updates



Lecture 8 - January 29

Lab1 Review (Part 2)

Identifying Atomicity in State Graph Recall (from EECS3342): System Variant Encoding & Checking Variant in TLA+

Announcements/Reminders

- Lab1 solution released
- Lab2 released
- TA contact information (on-demand for labs) on eClass
- Office Hours: 3pm to 4pm, Mon/Tue/Wed/Thu











Invariant us. Variant



Use of a Variant to Measure New Events Converging fixed



PO of Convergence/Non-Divergence/Livelock Freedom



```
---- MODULE bridgeController_m1_variant ----
                                                                 (e) a:= a+
EXTENDS Integers, Naturals, Sequences, TLC
                                                                                       (1) e is dd: V_{post} \ge
(2) e is new: V_{pe}
CONSTANT d
ASSUME /\ d \in Nat
      /\ d > 0
(*
--algorithm bridgeController_m1 {
 variable
                                                           = 2·X+b
   n = 0, a = 0, b = 0, c = 0,
   V_pre = 0, V_post = 0, old_evt_occurred = MALSE, new_evt_occurred = FALSE;
  (*
     Old events: ones that already exist in m0, which is refined by the current m1
    Value of the system variant is always increased or maintained
      by each occurrence of an old event.
 *)
 procedure ML_out() {
   ML_out_action: n := n + 1;
                  a := a + 1;
                   return;
 }
  procedure ML_in() {
   ML_in_action: n := n - 1;
                 c := c - 1;
                  return;
 }
  (*
    New events: ones that do not exist in m0, which is refined by the current m1
    Value of the system variant is always decreased
      by each occurrence of a new event event.
 *)
  procedure IL_in() {
   IL_in_action: a := a - 1;
                 b := b + 1;
                  return;
 }
                                                      captures the value of went
pre-state mext and or new.
 procedure IL_out() {
   IL_out_action: b := b - 1;
                  c := c + 1;
                   return;
 }
  {
   loop: while (TRUE) {
     (* Without the first two updates resetting the event log,
        when new_evt_occurred == true, after the next line,
        V_pre == V_post, which will violate the VAR variant constraint.
                                                        atomic updates
     *)
     update_variant_pre: new_evt_occurred := FALSE;
                          old_evt_occurred := FALSE;
                        V_pre := 2 * a + b;
     choice: either {
               ML_out: if ( (n < d) /\ (a + b < d) /\ (c = 0)) {
                  call ML out: call ML out();
                 update_evt_log_ml_out: new_evt_occurred := FALSE;
                                         old_evt_occurred := TRUE;
                                        V_post := 2 * a + b;
               };
              }
              or {
```

```
ML_in: if ( (n > 0) / (c > 0) ) {
                     call ML in: call ML in();
                     update_evt_log_ml_in new_evt_occurred := FALSE;
                                          old_evt_occurred := TRUE;
                                          V_post := 2 * a + b;
                   };
                 }
                 or {
                   IL in: if ( a > 0 ) {
                     call_IL_in: call IL_in();
                     update_evt_log_il_in new_evt_occurred := TRUE;
                                          old_evt_occurred := FALSE;
                                          V post := 2 * a + b;
                   };
                 }
                 or {
                   IL_out: if ( (b > 0) / (a = 0) ) {
                     call IL out: call IL out();
                     old evt occurred := FALSE;
                                           V_post := 2 * a + b;
                ;; takes place.
     }
   }
   *)
   \* BEGIN TRANSLATION (chksum(pcal) = "ce02e87c" /\ chksum(tla) = "5f2f5c21")
   . . .
   \* END TRANSLATION
   \* checking invariants
   inv1 1 == a \in Nat
   inv1_2 == b \in Nat
   inv1 3 == c \in Nat
   inv1_4 == a + b + c = n
   inv1_5 == (a = 0) \setminus / (c = 0)
  \* checking variants V
\mathbf{O} variants == 2 * a + b \neq 0
   event_log_consistent = ~(/\ old_evt_occurred = TRUE_/\ new_evt_occurred = TRUE)
   variant_not_decreased == (old_evt_occurred = TRUE => V_post >= V_pre)
   variant_decreased == (new_evt_occurred = TRUE => V_post < V_pre)</pre>
NAR
   \* checking deadlock freedom
   guard ML out == / (n < d)
                   / (a + b < d)
                   / (c = 0)
   guard_ML_in == / (n > 0)
                  /\ (c > 0)
   guard IL in == a > 0
   guard_IL_out == / (b > 0)
                  / (a = 0)
   deadlockfree == guard_ML_out \/ guard_ML_in \/ guard_IL_in \/ guard_IL_out
```

Lecture 9 - February 3

ProgTest1 Guide, Math Review

Implementation Correctness Completeness of Contracts: Pre-condition vs. Post-condition
Announcements/Reminders

- ProgTest1 guide released
- Mockup Test scheduled during lab on Thursday, Feb. 6
- Lab1 solution released
- Lab2 released
- Office Hours: 3pm to 4pm, Mon/Tue/Wed/Thu
- TA contact information (on-demand for labs) on eClass

Correct Algorithm and Complete Postcondition (1.1)



Correct Algorithm and Complete Postcondition (1.2)

———— MODULE ExampleModule EXTENDS Integers, Sequences, TLC CONSTANT inputSeq, inputVal —— algorithm BinarySearch { variables output = FALSE, ...

* Preconditions assert **Q**;

(* Implementation in PlusCal *) Imp.

* *Postcondition* 1 assert *R1*; * *Postcondition* 2 assert *R*2;







(2) Passing <1,3,2,-2> shall trigger some precand. error.

Correct Algorithm and Complete Postcondition (2.1)



Correct Algorithm and Complete Postcondition (2.2)

———— MODULE ExampleModule EXTENDS Integers, Sequences, TLC CONSTANT inputSeq, inputVal —— algorithm BinarySearch { variables output = FALSE, ...

* Preconditions assert /* inputSeq is sorted */;

(* Implementation in PlusCal *) Imp.

* *Postcondition 1* assert /* inputSeq unchanged */; * *Postcondition 2* assert /* output computed correctly */;

Imp. correct? I Specific 9/set mput = <2,4,1,3>Cosset cutput = <1,2,3,4> $m^{ch}/mput = <1,2,3,4>$ assar artant = FALSE ty the "complete differs set of postoarditions"

Correct Algorithm and Complete Postcondition (3.1)

————— **MODULE** ExampleModule **EXTENDS** Integers, Sequences, TLC **CONSTANT** input --- algorithm SomeAlgo { variables output = ..., ...* Preconditions assert Q; (* Implementation in PlusCal *) Imp. Josire required ***** Postcondition 1 assert(*R1*: * Postcondition 2 assert R2;

R1 and **R2** complete? (1) 7 of the kinds of TMP? Orrors are coptimed by etther one of them 2, if they account for all possible ways that the range can go wrong

Correct Algorithm and Complete Postcondition (3.2)

MODULE ExampleModule
 EXTENDS Integers, Sequences, TLC
 CONSTANT inputSeq, inputVal
 algorithm BinarySearch {
 variables
 output = FALSE, ...

* Preconditions assert /* inputSeq is sorted */;

(* Implementation in PlusCal *) Imp.

A * Postcondition 1 assert(R1;) Unchanged appl Assert R2, brilt output Y CONSULARS SUBMITETED 54

R1 and R2 complete?

Replace by a faulty imp. that alouarys remarks the Ist them in import.

a faulty Tup. which

(1) Assess quakey of

(2) ASSESS Quality of

gar

Predicate Logic: Exercise 1

Consider the following predicate:

 $\forall x, y \bullet x \in \mathbb{N} \land y \in \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow x * y > 0 \longrightarrow not a theorem.$

Choose all statements that are correct.

Lecture 10 - February 5

Math Review Exercises, Model Checking

Nested Quantification Model Checking Intro: \vdash *vs.* \models *State Graph vs. (Computation) Paths*

Announcements/Reminders

- ProgTest1 guide released
- Mockup Test scheduled in tomorrow's lab session
- Lab1 solution released
- Lab2 released
- Office Hours: 3pm to 4pm, Mon/Tue/Wed/Thu
- TA contact information (on-demand for labs) on eClass

Predicate Logic: Exercise 1

Consider the following predicate:

 $\forall \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \bullet \underline{\mathbf{x}} \in \mathbb{N} \land \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow \mathbf{x}^* \mathbf{y} > \mathbf{0}$

G Choose <u>all</u> statements that are correct.

7 not a theo rem

Predicate Logic: Exercise 2

Consider the following predicate:

 $\neg \bigcirc \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \bullet \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{N} \land \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{N} \oslash \mathbf{x}^* \mathbf{y} > \mathbf{0}$

Choose <u>all</u> statements that are correct.

V. It is a theorem, provable by (5, 4), $5 \in N \land 4 \in N \land$ 2. It is a theorem, provable by (2, 3). \times 3. It is a theorem, provable by (-2, -3). X4. It is not a theorem, witnessed by (5, 0). $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{3}{2}$ X5. It is not a theorem, <u>witnessed</u> by (12, -2). X6. It is not a theorem, witnessed by (12, 13).

> a theorem

Nested Logical Quantifiers

 $\forall i \bullet i \in \mathbb{Z} \Rightarrow (\exists j \bullet j \in \mathbb{N} \land i + j = 0)$ E LEN⇒ [70 WELNESS: Choose J=0 or J<0 $\exists i \bullet i \in \mathbb{N} \land (\forall j \bullet j \in \mathbb{Z} \Rightarrow i \cdot j \ge 0)$

Use of Model Checking in Industry

Pentium FDIV bug: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pentium_FDIV_bug

The Pentium FDIV bug is a hardware bug affecting the **floating-point unit (FPU)** of the early Intel Pentium processors. Because of the bug, the processor would return <u>incorrect</u> binary floating point results when dividing certain pairs of high-precision numbers.

In December 1994, Intel **recalled** the defective processors ... In its 1994 annual report, Intel said it incurred "**a \$475 million pre-tax charge** ... to recover replacement and write-off of these microprocessors."

In the aftermath of the **bug** and subsequent **recall**, there was a marked increase in the use of formal verification of hardware floating point operations across the **semiconductor industry**. Prompted by the discovery of the bug, a technique ... called "word-level model checking" was developed in 1996. Intel went on to use formal verification extensively in the development of later CPU architectures. In the development of the Pentium 4, symbolic trajectory evaluation and theorem proving were used to find a number of bugs that could have led to a similar recall incident had they gone undetected.



Tem

poral Logic	surrite X tree	M state	made (checke (7KA+,	ME Punkau Cstare
- Signtax :	strutural rules writing compo	for temporal und temporal	spin, Uppa real 4 formula	1. 1 × 0 M ≠ 0 ¬(M = 0)
ontext ior grammar	AZIBA DA TBATZOVI	al formula of	that's sim	tactically
- genicians	Correct, what	rs THS ME AND	ng?	7
z) hou 3) whe	s to check of a on the check facts, l	tomula 73 Sat	rsfies (M . 8. fool erro	$\neq \phi$) (traces?

State Graph VS. (Computation) Path



Lecture 11 - February 10

Lab2 Solution Walkthrough, Model Checking

Generalizing rounds, Function, Macro Postconditions: getAllSuffixes LTL Grammar: Top-Down Derivation

Announcements/Reminders

- ProgTest1 this Thursday during the lab session
 - + Please arrange your commute accordingly.
 - + Test will only be canceled if the university is closed.
- Practice Test questions and solutions released
- Lab1 and Lab2 solutions released
- Office Hours: 3pm to 4pm, Mon/Tue/Wed/Thu
- TA contact information (on-demand for labs) on eClass



```
numOfRoundsWonByPlayer1 = 0,
numOfRoundsWonByPlayer2 = 0,
    if (p1r1 = "R" / p2r1 = "P"){
       numOfRoundsWonBvPlayer2 := numOfRoundsWonBvPlayer2 + 1:
    else if (p1r1 = "R" / p2r1 = "S"){
       numOfRoundsWonBvPlayer1 := numOfRoundsWonBvPlayer1 + 1;
    ... /* Consider cases where p1r1 = "P" and p1r1 = "S" */
    \* Get prepared for the next round.
    choose_p1_next: with (x \in {"R", "P", "S"}) {
    choose_p2_next: with (x \in {"R", "P", "S"}) {
if (numOfRoundsWonByPlayer1 = numOfRoundsWonByPlayer2){
else if (numOfRoundsWonByPlayer1 > numOfRoundsWonByPlayer2){
```



Lab2 Solution: getAllSuffixes_v3 (1)



ostrondition

(1) Understand the Grantification expression on some concrete example.

Zs Practice witting from scratch.

Lab2 Solution: getAllSuffixes_v3 (2)



result

TEb.

<u>J</u>

LTL Syntax: Context-Free Grammar



[true] (t=p-dawn) derivates: [false] (Z [propositional atom] [logical negation] $\neg \phi$) **D** [logical conjunction] $\phi \land \phi$ logical disjunction $\phi \lor \phi$ logical implication $\phi \Rightarrow \phi$ $(\mathbf{X}\phi)$ \odot [neXt state] $(\mathbf{F}\phi)$ [some **F**uture state] [all future states (**G**lobally)] $(\mathbf{G}\phi)$ [Until] $(\phi \mathbf{U} \phi)$ $(\phi \mathbf{W} \phi)$ [Weak-until] $(\phi \mathbf{R} \phi)$ [**R**elease]

Lecture 12 - February 24

Model Checking

Operator Precedence Parse Trees, LMDs, RMDs

Announcements/Reminders

- ProgTest1 grading started on SUN, Feb 23
 - + Expected to get raw results from TAs by MON, Mar 3
- Lab3 to be released
- WrittenTest1 guide to be released
- This week's office hour: 3pm, Wed
- TA contact information (on-demand for labs) on eClass

Operator Precedence (...) In the obsence of pathentheses, what's the order of evaluation? O fourbral logital tiontest 1+ Unany Temporal Operator */ e.g. $F \phi_1 \Rightarrow \phi_2$ N. 0 = 3 someMeaning $(F \phi_1) \Rightarrow \phi_2$ $(F \phi_1) \Rightarrow \phi_2$ $(F \phi_1) \Rightarrow \phi_2$ ϕ_1 ϕ_2 ϕ_1 ϕ_2 ϕ_2 X, F, G Next Jubure global 1× Brinary Temporal Operator *1 U, W, R until week until release /* Logrial Operator */ $7, \Lambda, V, \Rightarrow$



Parsing: Some Practical Knowledge



Assumption: Operator precedence considered first before the CFG.

Interpreting a Formula: Parse Trees (1)



Interpreting a Formula: Parse Trees (2)



Interpreting a Formula: Parse Trees (3)



Interpreting a Formula: Parse Trees (4)



Interpreting a Formula: LMD (1)


Interpreting a Formula: LMD (2)

$F(p \land G q \Rightarrow p U r)$



Interpreting a Formula: LMD (3)

 ϕ

[true] ::= [false] OI WI SI [propositional atom] р [logical negation] $(\neg \phi)$ [logical conjunction] $(\phi \land \phi)$ FON $(\phi \lor \phi)$ [logical disjunction] $(\phi \Rightarrow \phi)$ [logical implication] $(\mathbf{X}\phi)$ [ne**X**t state] Φ D $(\mathbf{F}\phi)$ [some Future state] B $(\mathbf{G}\phi)$ [all future states (Globally)] $\phi \Rightarrow \phi$ $(\phi \mathbf{U} \phi)$ [Until] g $(\phi \mathbf{W} \phi)$ [Weak-until] $\wedge(G\phi \Rightarrow \phi)$ $(\phi \mathbf{R} \phi)$ [**R**elease] $(G_{Q} \Rightarrow \emptyset)$ $(G_{Q} \Rightarrow \emptyset \cup \emptyset)$ Fp λ Fρ ٨ $(Gq \Rightarrow P)$ $(Gq \Rightarrow P)$ $\cup \phi)$ FD

 $\mathbf{F} \mathbf{p} \wedge (\mathbf{G} \mathbf{q} \Rightarrow \mathbf{p} \mathbf{U} \mathbf{r})$

Interpreting a Formula: LMD (4)

F $p \land ((G q \Rightarrow p) U r)$



Interpreting a Formula: **RMD** (1) **F** $p \land G q \Rightarrow p U r$

1		
ϕ ::=	= T	
	\perp	[false]
i	p	[propositional atom] $\neg \varphi \Rightarrow \phi$
i i	$(\neg \phi)$	[logical negation]
	$(\phi \land \phi)$	[logical conjunction] $(20, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0$
	$(\phi \land \phi)$	[logical disjunction]
	$(\phi \lor \phi)$	
	$(\phi \Rightarrow \phi)$	[logical implication] 🎽 🧷 🔿 🔿
	$(\mathbf{X}\phi)$	[neXt state]
.	$(\mathbf{F}\phi)$	[some Future state]
	$(\mathbf{G}\phi)$	[all future states (Globally)]
i i	$(\phi \mathbf{U} \phi)$	[Until] (S) (
	$(\phi \mathbf{W} \phi)$	$[W_{eak-until]} \rightarrow \mathcal{O} \land \mathcal{O} \rightarrow \mathcal{V} \lor \checkmark$
	$(\phi \Pi \phi)$	
	$(\phi \mathbf{n} \phi)$	
		$\neg \rho \wedge \alpha \phi \neg \gamma \cup \gamma$
		$\Rightarrow 0 \land h \land \Rightarrow p () \lor$
		ラトヤヘルダラアUV
		$\Rightarrow F \nabla A G a \Rightarrow D () V$

Interpreting a Formula: **RMD** (2) **F** ($p \land G q \Rightarrow p \cup r$)

ϕ	::=	Т	[<i>true</i>] _	Φ	ψ
		\perp	[false]	Ľ Š	$F(\mathcal{O})$
	- î	Ø	[propositional atom]	á	
		$(\neg \phi)$	[logical negation]	Z	$\Gamma(D \Rightarrow D)$
		$(\phi \land \phi)$	[logical conjunction]	Ă	
	- t	$(\phi \land \phi)$	[logical disjunction]	<u>S</u>	てんちかいめい
		$(\phi \lor \phi)$	[logical disjunction]	\exists	
		$(\phi \Rightarrow \phi)$		Ð	
		$(\mathbf{X}\phi)$	[ne x t state]	- 	$\Sigma F(D \Rightarrow D \cup V)$
-		$(\mathbf{F}\phi)$	[some F uture state]	Á	
-		$(\mathbf{G}\phi)$	[all future states (G lobally)]	<u> </u>	$T(b = -v_{0})$
		$(\phi \mathbf{U} \phi)$	[U ntil]	\neg	$\gamma F(\psi \rightarrow \gamma \cup v)$
		$(\phi \mathbf{W} \phi)$	[Weak-until]	b	
	- î	$(\phi \mathbf{R} \phi)$	[R elease]	\rightarrow	$h \vdash (O \land O \rightrightarrows P \cap V)$
				Ń	
				<u>u</u>	$\Gamma(O(A - D)))$
				ਡੋ	FLERCEPTOD
				(A)	TILLODDON
				\ni	$+(\mathcal{P} \wedge \mathcal{G} \mathcal{G} \mathcal{G} \mathcal{G} \mathcal{G} \mathcal{G} \mathcal{G} \mathcal{G}$
				(()	
				3	$F(\mathbf{p} \land \mathbf{h} \mathcal{Q} \Rightarrow \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{v}))$

Interpreting a Formula: **RMD** (3) **F** $p \land$ (**G** $q \Rightarrow p$ **U** r)

ϕ	::=	Т	
		\perp	[false]
	Í	р	[propositional atom]
	Í	$(\neg \phi)$	[logical negation]
	i	$(\phi \land \phi)$	[logical conjunction] $\Rightarrow \varphi \land \langle \varphi \neq \varphi \rangle$
	i	$(\phi \lor \phi)$	[logical disjunction] 🕢 / / / / / / /
	i.	$(\phi \Rightarrow \phi)$	[logical implication] $\Rightarrow \phi \land (\phi \Rightarrow \phi \cup \phi)$
-	i	$(\mathbf{X}\phi)$	[next state]
-	i	$(\mathbf{F}\phi)$	[some Future state] $3 \delta \wedge (\delta \Rightarrow \varphi \cup \vee)$
	i	$(\mathbf{G}\phi)$	[all future states (Globally)]
	İ	$(\phi \mathbf{U} \phi)$	[Until] 4 / / / /
	i	$(\phi \mathbf{W} \phi)$	$Weak-until = 29 \land (9 \Rightarrow 90)$
	- İ	$(\phi \mathbf{R} \phi)$	Release C C C
			$\Rightarrow \mathcal{O} \land (\pi \mathcal{O} \Rightarrow \mathcal{O} \mathcal{O})$
			$ \Rightarrow \phi \land (A \land \neg P \lor)) $
			STOALLANDUL)
			$\Rightarrow FP^{(GQ, \Rightarrow PUP)}$

Interpreting a Formula: **RMD** (4) **F** $p \land ((G q \Rightarrow p) U r)$

ϕ	::=	Т	true
		\perp	[false]
	Í	р	[propositional atom]
	Ì	$(\neg \phi)$	[logical negation] [2] ((4,) 4)
	- i	$(\phi \wedge \phi)$	$\begin{bmatrix} \log i \cos l & \cos l & \cos l & \sin l & \delta & \delta & \delta & \delta & \delta & \delta & \delta & \delta & \delta &$
		$(\phi \land \phi)$	
		$(\phi \lor \phi)$	[logical disjunction]
		$(\phi \Rightarrow \phi)$	$\left[\text{logical implication} \right] \rightarrow \emptyset \land (\emptyset \cup V)$
		$(\mathbf{X}\phi)$	[neXt state]
	- İ	$(\mathbf{F}\phi)$	some Future state
	Ì	$(\mathbf{G}\phi)$	[all future states (Globally)]
	- i	$(\phi \mathbf{U} \phi)$	
		$(\phi \mathbf{W} \phi)$	$[W_{eak-until}] \stackrel{\sim}{\rightarrow} \mathcal{O} \land ((\mathcal{O} \stackrel{\sim}{\rightarrow} \mathcal{O}) \mathcal{O} \mathcal{V})$
		$(\phi \Pi \phi)$	
		(φηφ)	
			= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
			$\mathfrak{B} \mathcal{O} \wedge ((\mathcal{H} \mathcal{Q}) \mathfrak{B} \mathcal{D}) \mathcal{O} \vee)$
			$\neg F\Psi \land ((GG) \neg P) UV)$
			$\Im \vdash \square \land ((\triangleleft))) () \vee)$

Interpreting a Formula: PT vs. LMD vs. RMD



Deriving Subformulas from a Parse Tree



Lecture 13 - February 26

Model Checking

Subformula Labeled Transition System (LTS) Paths, Path Suffixes

Announcements/Reminders

- WrittenTest1 guide & examples by the end of <u>Friday</u> + All lectures materials up to and <u>including</u> today
 - + Lab1 and Lab2 (solutions & in-class discussion)
 - + Review Q&A (Zoom): 7:30pm on Monday, Mar 3
- Lab3 to be released next Wednesday
- Tomorrow's lab (9 to 10): office hour for your WT1
- This week's office hour: 3pm, Wed
- TA contact information (on-demand for labs) on eClass

$\phi \cong \phi \cong \phi \Rightarrow \phi \Rightarrow \phi \cong \cdots \cong F_{P \land G_{P}} \Rightarrow \phi \cong \cdots$ Interpreting a Formula: PT vs. LMD vs. RMD

 $\mathbf{F} \mathbf{p} \wedge \mathbf{G} \mathbf{q} \Rightarrow \mathbf{p} \mathbf{U} \mathbf{r} \in \mathcal{L}(q)$ RMD $\Rightarrow \phi \Rightarrow \phi$ Φ シクシ $\textcircled{} \Rightarrow \not q \land \not p \Rightarrow \not p$ $\Rightarrow \phi \Rightarrow \phi \cup \phi$ 2 3==F\$1\$=\$ 3 $\Rightarrow \phi \Rightarrow \phi \cup r$ $D \Rightarrow PUr$ (D) > FPA (D) > 0 \Rightarrow (B) FP / GE > 0 ⇒Øn @⇒pUr HO. Ø O> FP / GQ > O 5 ⇒ ¢ ∧ G ¢ ⇒ pUr ⇒ØAGq⇒pUr > FpAGg=> Ø U Q=> T P A G q=> P U Q Q=> F Ø A G q=> pUr Q=> F P A G q=> P U r Q=> F P A G Q=> pUr (9)⇒FPXG8 ⇒ pur

Deriving Subformulas from a Parse Tree





Labelled Transition System (LTS)

Exercises Consider the system with a counter *c* with the following assumption:

 $0 \le \textit{C} \le 3$

Say *c* is initialized 0 and may be incremented (via a transition *inc*, enabled when c < 3) or decremented (via a transition *dec*, enabled when c > 0).

• **<u>Draw</u>** a *state graph* of this system.

• **Formulate** the state graph as an *LTS* (via a triple (S, \rightarrow, L)). <u>Assume</u>: Set *P* of atoms is: { $c \ge 1, c \le 1$ }



Labelled Transition System (LTS): Formulation & Paths





Lecture 14 - March 3

Model Checking

Unfolding/Unwinding Paths Satisfaction Relations: Path vs. Model Formulations: X, F, G

Announcements/Reminders

- ProgTest1 results to be released (by end of Friday)
- WrittenTest1 guide & examples released
 - + Review Q&A (Zoom): 7:30pm on Monday, Mar 3
- Lab3 to be released after WrittenTest1
- Office Hours: 3pm to 4pm, Mon/Tue/Wed/Thu
- TA contact information (on-demand for labs) on eClass



Satzstaction Relations

(1) Path Satisfaction



(2) Madel Satisfaction

 $M, S \models \phi$ (S, 7, L)E model SES formulated as an LTS need to consider all paths starting from state S.

Path Satisfaction: Logical Operations



Slide 33



Path Satisfaction: Temporal Operations (2)

A path satisfies (Gp -> Hereforth, \$ 3 tule.

if the every state satisfies it.



Formulation (over a path)



Path Satisfaction: Temporal Operations (3)

if some future state satisfies it.



Formulation (over a path)



Model vs. Path Satisfaction: Exercises (1.1)



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Review Q & A - Mar. 3

Written Test 1

LTS: Deadlock Freedom



Lecture 15 - March 5

Model Checking

Model Satisfaction Path vs. Model Satisfactions: X,G, F

Announcements/Reminders

- ProgTest1 results to be released (by end of Friday)
- WrittenTest1 guide & examples released
- Review Q&A materials posted
- Lab3 to be released after WrittenTest1
- Office Hours: 3pm to 4pm, Mon/Tue/Wed/Thu
- TA contact information (on-demand for labs) on eClass

Model Satisfaction

<u>Given</u>:

- Model M = (S, →, L)
- State $s \in S$
- LTL Formula 🔶

M, $s \models \phi$ **iff** for every path π of M starting at s, $\pi \models \phi$.

Formulation (over all paths) $T = S \Rightarrow \cdots$ $S \models (1) \text{ for prove vs. disprove M, } = \phi?$ (1) To prove S = ϕ , need to show that every path (pathon) TL, TL (2) To disprove S = ϕ , pointer a states path TL, $T(T \models \phi)$

Model vs. Path Satisfaction: Exercises (1.2)



Model vs. Path Satisfaction: Exercises (2.1)



Model vs. Path Satisfaction: Exercises (2.2)



Model vs. Path Satisfaction: Exercises (3.1)



Model vs. Path Satisfaction: Exercises (3.2) reachable = 51 - 50 - 51



Exercise: What if we change the LHS to si?
Model vs. Path Satisfaction: Exercises (4.1)



Exercise: What if we change the LHS to π^2 ?

Lecture 16 - March 10

Model Checking

Nesting Temporal Operators: FG¢ Exercise: G¢ vs. FG¢

Announcements/Reminders

- ProgTest1 results & feedback released
 - + Submit a regrading request if necessary.
- WT1 results to be released by the end of Friday
- Lab3 released
- Guide for **ProgTest2** to be released
- Office Hours: 3pm to 4pm, Mon/Tue/Wed/Thu
- TA contact information (on-demand for labs) on eClass

Model vs. Path Satisfaction: Exercises (4.2)





Nesting "Global" and "Future" in LTL Formulas



JC. 1710

= (model sof.) Each path starting with s is s.t. <u>eventually</u>, ϕ holds continuously.

Q. Formulate the above nested pattern of LTL operator. $S(F)FG\phi \in \forall \pi \cdot \pi = S \rightarrow \cdots \Rightarrow$

Q. How to prove the above nested pattern of LTL operators? ** @ Find a withess i *** 3 each state at index i, it, it, it, ... Q. How to disprove the above nested pattern of LTL operators? * O Find a witness TC = S -> " For all possible future states at indreps 1, 2, 3, ...

Model Satisfaction: Exercises (5.1)





Lecture 17 - March 17

Model Checking

Parsing Property Exercise: F¢ ⇒ FG¢

Nesting Temporal Operators: GF ϕ

Announcements/Reminders

- ProgTest2 guide & example questions released
- WrittenTest2 potential shift of date?
- ProgTest1 results & feedback released
 - + Submit a regrading request if necessary.
- WT1 results & feedback released
- Lab3 due today
- Office Hours: 3pm to 4pm, Mon/Tue/Wed/Thu
- TA contact information (on-demand for labs) on eClass

Correction: Exercise 2.2 from March 5



Given two LTL formula strangs f_1 and f_2 $F_p \wedge G_q \Rightarrow p \cup r (F_p) \wedge (G_q)$ $f_1 \oplus f_2 \oplus p \cup r (F_p) \wedge (G_q) = > (p \cup r)$ (1) If $fl \neq fz$, but fi and fz have the same parse tree, fi and fz are considered as semantically equivalent. 070 (2) If fl = fz, but fi and fz have distinct PTs, p. poup FØGØP Y this means the Grammar 75 ambigions. (e.g., 'daughing else " P 9



Nesting "Global" and "Future" in LTL Formulas



Each path π starting with s is s.t. if eventually $\phi 1$ holds on $\pi,$

then ϕ_2 eventually holds on π continuously.

Q. Formulate the above nested pattern of LTL operators. * $\forall \pi \cdot \pi = S \rightarrow \cdots \Rightarrow$ / $(\exists \tau_1 \cdot \tau_1 \gg | \wedge \pi^{\tau_1} \models \phi_1)$

Q. How to prove the above nested pattern of LTL operators? Q. How to prove the above nested pattern of LTL operators? D. Consider all path patterns staring with $\leq 2^{44}$ for each path $\begin{array}{c} a. & 7 \Rightarrow 7\\ b. & F \Rightarrow -\end{array}$ Q. How to disprove the above nested pattern of LTL operators? * O Show a witness path Ti @ for Ti, show: $T \Rightarrow F$ Model Satisfaction: Exercises $(5.2) \oplus 5 \rightarrow 12 \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow 5 \rightarrow 12$

3 50 -> Lz -> Lo -> -- -> Jz ->





Nesting "Global" and "Future" in LTL Formulas

$s \models GF \phi$ "infinitely ϕ is two.

Each path starting with s is s.t. continuously, ϕ eventually holds.

Q. Formulate the above nested pattern of LTL operator. * $\forall \pi \cdot \pi = \$ \Rightarrow \cdots \Rightarrow$ $(\forall \overline{\iota} \cdot \overline{\iota} \Rightarrow | \Rightarrow (\exists \overline{\iota} \cdot \overline{\iota} \Rightarrow \overline{\iota} \land \pi^{\overline{\iota}} \models \varphi))$ Q. How to prove the above nested pattern of LTL operators?

Q. How to **disprove** the above nested pattern of LTL operators?



(1) $GF \phi \Rightarrow G\phi$ (2) $G \phi \Rightarrow GF \phi$ (3) $GF \phi \Leftrightarrow G\phi$



(1) $FG\phi \Rightarrow GF\phi$ (2) $GF\phi \Rightarrow FG\phi$ (3) $FG\phi \Leftrightarrow FF\phi$

Lecture 18 - March 19

Model Checking

Nested Temporal Operator: GF¢

Exercise: Go vs. GFo

Exercise: FG vs. GF

Announcements/Reminders

- ProgTest2 focuses on Lab2 (no Lab3).
- WrittenTest2 date remains unchanged.
- ProgTest1 results & feedback released
 - + Submit a regrading request if necessary.
- WT1 results & feedback released
- Lab3 solution released
- Office Hours: 3pm to 4pm, Mon/Tue/Wed/Thu
- TA contact information (on-demand for labs) on eClass

Nesting "Global" and "Future" in LTL Formulas



Each path starting with s is s.t. continuously, ϕ eventually holds.

Q. Formulate the above nested pattern of LTL operator.

Model Satisfaction: Exercises (6.1)



Exercise: What if we change the LHS to s₂?

Model Satisfaction: Exercises (6.2)



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Exercise: What if we change the LHS to s₂?









Lecture 19 - March 24

Model Checking

Temporal Operators: U, W, R Formulating English Sentences in LTL

Announcements/Reminders

- WrittenTest2 this Thursday
- Lab4 to be released
- Office Hour this week: 3pm on Wed, Thu
- TA contact information (on-demand for labs) on eClass

20 MEA











not exacting

GPz (so

rase

<u>(as</u>

Path Satisfaction: Temporal Operations (6)

- $\pi = \phi \mathbf{R} \phi 2$
- If there is ever <u>a future state</u> that satisfies ϕ_1 , then

Si

Si

- until then, all states satisfy \$\phi_2\$.
- Or, \$\$ must always hold (i.e., never released).

Formulation (over a path)



 $(\exists z \cdot \overline{z} > | \land (\land \forall \overline{z}))$

Si+1



Formulating Natural Language in LTL (1)



 $\begin{array}{l}
G \phi = \neg F \neg \phi \\
F \phi = \neg G \neg \phi
\end{array}$

Formulating Natural Language in LTL (2.1)

Natural Language:

It's impossible to reach a state

where the system is started but not ready.


Formulating Natural Language in LTL (2.2)

G (requested = Fack.

2 3 4 Tree reg Tree

Natural Language:

Whenever a request is made,

it will be acknowledged <u>eventually</u>.

Assumed atoms:

- requested
- acknowledged





Formulating Natural Language in LTL (2.3)

Natural Language:

An elevator traveling upwards at the 2nd floor

5

4

3

does not change its direction

when it has passengers wishing to to to the 5th floor.

Assumed atoms:

- floor2, floor5
- directionUp
- buttonPressed5

LTL Formulation



Lecture 20 - March 26

Model Checking

Exercises: U, W, R Stronger vs. Weaker Assertions

Announcements/Reminders

- WrittenTest2 this Thursday
- Lab4 to be released
- Office Hour this week: 3pm on Wed, Thu
- TA contact information (on-demand for labs) on eClass

Formulating Natural Language in LTL (1)





Formulating Natural Language in LTL (2.4)

Natural Language:

Whenever a process makes a request, it starts waiting. As soon as no other process is in the critical region, the process is granted access to the critical region.

LTL Formulation

Gi (regrested => (noDieInCSR)

ut wing growthat (No One In (SA waiting

Slide 52

Assumed atoms:

- requested
- waiting
- granted
- <u>noOneInCs</u>

Q. Is starvation freedom guaranteed? All⁵⁵

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Model Satisfaction: Exercises (7.1)



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Model Satisfaction: Exercises (7.2)



Exercise: What if we change the LHS to s₂?





- definitions · F, G, X

Ly prove vs. disprove them?

- path vs. model satisfaction.



Lecture 21 - March 31

Program Verification

Weakest Precond: Predicate Transformer wp Rules: Assignments, Conditionals

Announcements/Reminders

- WrittenTest2 result released
- Lab4 released
- Bonus opportunity: Final Course Evaluation
- Office Hour this week: 3pm on Mon, Tue, Wed, Thu
- TA contact information (on-demand for labs) on eClass

Stronger vs. Weaker Assertions: Pre- vs. Post-Conditions



Program Correctness: Example (1)



Program Correctness: Example (2)



Tony Harre (guick sort) Hoare Triple: Syntax and Semantics





Hoare Triple: Incorrect Program



Program Correctness: Revisiting Example (1)



Program Correctness: Revisiting Example (2)



Expressing Pre-State vs. Post-State Values



Rules of Weakest Precondition: Assignment



Correctness of Programs: Assignment (1)



Correctness of Programs: Assignment (2)

What is the weakest precondition for a program x := x + 1 to establish the postcondition $x > x_0$?

Exertse

$$\{??\} \times := x + 1 \{x = 23\}$$

Rules of Weakest Precondition: Conditionals



Correctness of Programs: **Conditionals**



Lecture 22 - April 2

Program Verification

wp rule: Sequential Composition Loop Invariant vs. Loop Variant Correctness Conditions of Loops

Announcements/Reminders

- Exam guide released
- Some example questions to be released by <u>April 7</u>
- WrittenTest2 result released
- Lab4 released
- Bonus opportunity: Final Course Evaluation
- Office Hour this week: 3pm on Wed, Thu
- TA contact information (on-demand for labs) on eClass

wp Calculation for Sequential Composition



Correctness of Programs: Sequential Composition



Correctness of Loops



Loop Invariant (Bodean)

Contracts of Loops

<u>Syntax</u>





Assume: Q and R are true



Contracts of Loops: Violations

Assume: Q and R are true



Exercise

Contracts of Loops: Visualization


Correct Loops: Proof Obligations



Correct Loops: Proof Obligations



Example

- No multiple chore questions

- definitions - short answers Ls justification Ls assertions (Cabz), algorithm as long cs (Cabz), algorithm as long regiment). Ls assertions (Cabz), algorithm as long regiment). Ls proofs. (math review), LTC>.



- consuer book let

I hope you enjoyed learning with me A All the best to you ?